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SOCIOLOGY .OF LAW-A STUDENT'S CONCEPT
The Anglo-American lawyer is inclined to restrain his interest to the
legal order; he becomes a specialist in the decisions rendered by the courts.
The attorney, unfamiliar with present day methodology of the social sciences,
is easily bewildered by the writings and judicial decisions of the sociological
jurist. Part of this bewilderment may be at once eliminated by distinguishing
two concepts of "law." The lawyer may conceive of the law as "that which
is backed by the force of politically organized society." 1 An inadequate amount
of attention is directed toward the sources of law, its trends and its functions.
Sociologists have a different meaning, and emphasize the functional phase of
law. It is, they say, an institution of social control, an instrument in ordering
human conduct. For its survival and betterment society uses law to control the
individual. Sociologists have written of primitive societies which regulate
their members without the support of any legal tribunals. Non-legal means
of regulating the individual are by no means limited to primitive groups, but
exist in all societies. These social controls are to be found in the United States
of 1947, even though our country has 'developed a highly complex and extensive system of law. Thurman Arnold dramatically emphasized the importance of one such control: "It is therefore not the content of the governmental
creed which molds institutions, but the imaginary personalities which make
up the national mythology....

Let me designate the heroes of a nation and

I care not who writes its constitution." 2 The Sociologist Gurvitch defines the
law as an attempt to realize in a given social environment the ideas of justice
through regulation based on a determined link between claims and duties.3
Many social controls function quite independently of the sanctions and
force of politically organized society; other social controls are a part of the
jurisprudence of a society. Sociology has been working with jurisprudence
towards a better understanding of law and of what lies behind the phenomenon
of legal order. Sociology is a study of the cultural patterns, social patterns,
social symbols, and collective spiritual values and ideas in their functional
relations with social structures. Ruth Benedict points out that a person's behavior can be understood only after comparing it with the whole social pattern; the single act in response to a situation has no meaning or definition
when viewed alone. The Dobu Indian Chief was considered abnormal by
the members of his society because he was ambitious. 4 In.the same way law is
1. Pound mentioned this narrov concept of law in his preface to Georges Gurvitch's
SOCIOLOGY OF LAV, p. IX (1942).
2. ARNoLD, FOLKLORE OF CAPiTALISm 34 (1937).
3. GuRvrrCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 50-60 (1942).
4. BEzNmicr, PATrnRzs OF CULTURE (1934). The author observed the absence of
rivalry and competition in the Dobu culture, an extreme contrast to present day culture
of the United States. The possession of this character trait by a member of our culture is
considered normal; in fact, a person not possessing ambition is considered abnormal.
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only one aspect of social control, and when viewed alone the law has little
meaning. An understanding of law requires not only a knowledge of legal
principles, but also an understanding of the law as a part of social control,
and in turn a comprehension of social control as a part of the whole cultural
pattern. Schreier recognized the need for a more comprehensive view, thus:
"The postulate of completeness in legal science can be met only by a complete
grasp of social life as conditioned by law and by non-legal agencies whose
activities play a decisive part in the control of an individual." r
Though an individual masters the principles of law and of social control,
these alone do not afford him with a complete comprehension of jurisprudence.
In 1748 Montesquieu wrote of various factors influencing the law: ".... the
rules of law are relative to the physical configuration of the country, whether
the climate is glacial, torrid or temperate; to the quality of the terrain, its situation and size; to the type of life led by its people, whether they are tillers of
the soil, hunters or herdsmen; . . . to the religion of the inhabitants; their
inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their mores and
their manners." 6 Certainly this list was not considered by Montesquieu as an
all inclusive one. For example, consider another potent influence, the distribution of wealth among the members of a society. Each enumerated factor has
a different degree of influence on the various groups, depending upon the
whole concrete situation and the beliefs of the society in question.
Economic doctrines have been a great influence on Anglo-American law;
laissez faire was a strong mutative force on our law during the Nineteenth
Century. Certain aspects of this doctrine of absolute economic freedom have
been altered, and the most conspicuous change has been the limitation on the
concept of contractual relations as a free accord between the individual wills
of the bargaining parties. State legislatures have limited the extent of the
rule's application as to contract law by means of statutes, which are mandatory on the contracting parties. Certain clauses, by statute, are made an integral
part of insurance contracts though the bargaining parties make no mention
of the provision in the written agreement. In fact, the statutes often provide binding restrictions on the insurer although the contract of itisurance
may be inconsistent with the legislative enactment. Many transactions, which
are still called contracts, represent only adhesions to legal concepts, without
will on the part of one of the contracting parties, e. g., contracts for labor,
transportation contracts, and contracts for gas, water or electricity. Under the
modified contractual law the contracting party possessing the superior bar5. Schreier, Die Zuknuft der Rechtswissenschaft in JURISTISCHE BLATTER (Vienna),
May 21, 1927, p. 147.
6. Translation may be found: GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAw 76 (1942).

COMMENTS

113

gaining power must accept the jural order imposed on him, which order he
7
cannot modify.
A specific illustration should be mentioned to show the power of economic
forces to change a rule of law. It is a common belief of our society that a
thief should not be allowed to deprive the true owner of his property. The
true owner of stolen property is entitled to recover its possession though the
property is held by one who purchased from the thief, the purchaser having
paid the thief full value for the property without knowledge or suspicion of
the theft. The doctrine of caveat emptor permitted the original owner to replevy the property when found, and so the buyer lost the property because
the seller's title was defective. As a result, purchasers hesitated to buy property,
realizing that it could be taken from them by an unknown holder of title. This
hesitancy to purchase property retarded the free and expeditious exchange of
goods, which exchange was considered essential to our modern system of high
speed production. On the one hand, our common beliefs would not permit a
thief to deprive a true owner of the right to recover his property by means
of its sale to an innocent third party for value. On the other hand, our economic
interests demanded that a good title be given to the innocent purchaser in
order to expedite the flow of goods through the process of production. The
rule of law, as applicable to negotiable instruments and negotiable documents
of title, has been changed by statutes so that the purchaser of a note may
obtain from the thief an interest which prevails over the claims of the original
owner of the note.8
That the "official law" bows before social and economic pressure is shown
in another way. The attempt to enforce federal prohibition laws ended in
failure, and in their repeal. 9 The mores' 0 of the American people were in
conflict with the "official law" and, as expected, the mores prevailed. In a like
manner any criminal statutes considered by society to be too severe will be
meliorated or ignored by the judges, the prosecutois and the jurors."
Lawyers and judges are actively engaged in the application of the techniques of social control to" concrete cases before them. Law is one of the
agencies, or phases, of social control. Law is more formal and often more
obvious, especially to the historian, than other institutions of social control
such as the family, the church and religion, art, education and science. In
7. GURViTCH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 131.
8. NEGOTrABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 57. UNIFORM SALES AcT §§ 32, 38.
9. U. S. CoNST. AMEND. XVIII as repealed by U. S. CONsT. AMEND. XXI.
10. For a definition of mores see: SuMNER, FOLKWAYS 59-60 (1906).
11. Time, Oct. 6, 1947, p. 28, col. 1: "At Pikeville, Ky., Crawford Casebolt, a 13year-old seventh-grader convicted of using a pistol to rob a man of an auto, a watch and
$4.84 in cash, was sentenced ... 'to spend the rest of his natural life at hard labor,' the
minimum sentence possible under Kentucky's armed robbery law."
Time, Nov. 3, 1947, p. 11, col. 1: "Crawford Casebolt has been paroled and is now
at Boys Town."
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modern society the trend is for law to become an increasingly more important
means of social control. Dean Roscoe Pound noted that demand for the socialization of the law in this country has come almost wholly, if not entirely, from
urban centers.' 2 In the urban community the primary-group-controls of the
play group, the family, and the neighborhood, have lost much of their influence. At the same time, effectiveness of the church and religion on the
individual's behavior has declined. An attempt has been made to replace these
weakened controls by means of laws, and laws multiplied by more laws.
Growth of densely populated cities has brought about many mutations in the
law. Apartment buildings and overcrowding of closely constructed houses have
increased the density of population; such close living together demands a redefinition of human and property rights. The mutual interdependence of urban
populations requires the downfall of existing rights. The general welfare of the
community calls for the yielding of certain absolute, but minor, rights of the
individual. City governments have effected changes in citizens' rights through
their zoning laws, even though some cities have not yet enacted such ordinances.
Zoning restrictions on real property prohibit such a use as would be detrimental to the owner and possessor of adjacent property.
A timely question remains to be answered by the sociologist of law : Has
this multitude of laws been a successful substitute for the broken down social
controls of our society? This phenomenal growth in the body of the law is
the result of an attempt to replace by legal regulations other social controls,
so deteriorated as to influence little the behavior of individuals in a society.
The breakdown of primary groups has been most frequent in urban centers. 1
A corollary of this deterioration of the family and the neighborhood has been
a diminution of the influences of primary-group-controls over the social behavior of individuals. For example, the household has been replaced to no
small extent by juvenile courts and courts of domestic relations.
At the insistence of sociologists and jurists there has been a development
of two separate spheres of social science. The need for team play between
law and sociology was recently recognized, and there has been increasing cooperation between them toward common objectives. Dean Pound, encouraged
by recent developments in the sociology of law, wrote: "Perhaps the most
significant advance in the modem science of law is the change from the
analytical to the functional standpoint." 14 The functional attitude requires that
judges, jurists and attorneys keep in mind the relation between law and living
social reality. The jurisprudence of the United States, developed during the
existence of our pioneer agricultural society, must be adapted to our typically
12. POUND, THE SPIRIr OF THE COMMON LAW 129 (1921).

13. GisT AND HoLBERT, URBAN SocIEry 306 (1945).
14. PouND, Administrative Applicatim of Legal Standards, PROCEEDINGS
BAR AssociATioN, 441, 449 (1919).
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urban, industrial society of the Twentieth Century. During the past fifteen
years there has been an encouraging trend in this country in that greater
emphasis has been placed on the maximum satisfaction of collective needs
and less concern is shown over the freedom of individual wills.
Law tends to be stable, fixed, and to lag behind the advances in our changing society. Our law developed in response to the demands of an agricultural
society, but during the last six decades this country has experienced a rapid
rate of urbanization. When the law is too inflexible, revolt is the inevitable
result. Dean Pound considers our law quite flexible, and as an example he
points to the law relating to the common carriers, which first developed during
a transportation age of carrying goods and passengers by horses. In the last
century this country has seen the development of the railroad, the truck, the
automobile, and the airplane as means of transportation. Each new development has speeded up commuiication and the flow of merchandise. Our laws
for the common carriers have been adapted to meet new demands made of
them. Nevertheless, there has been a marked tendency for the law to lag behind
our scientific and mechanical development. However, cannot this same indictment be brought against other social sciences? A society's law tends to lag
noticeably behind its morality and philosophical thought. The latter ordinarily
move ahead of law and are important factors in the mutations of law. Morality,
by its structure, is more dynamic, more revolutionary, more mobile, more
directed towards the future than is the law. By its nature law is more attached
to traditional practices than to acts of innovation, more dependent on economic
realities, and more associated with the balance of many forces than is morality.
It should, however, be mentioned that the reverse situation is possible: that
law may advance too far beyond the morality of a society. This phenomenon
exists only during unusuai circumstances, such as the last phases of a revolution or during major legal reforms when legislative measures surpass the
morality which helped to demolish the old law. Such anticipations of law over
morality generally provoke reactionary behavior. This occurrence has been
so extremely common during the late stages of revolution that counter revolution has been considered as just another phase of a revolutionary era. 15
On numerous occasions the courts of law have been severely criticized for
following precedent. At this time, we should consider the three arguments of
Justice Cardozo in support of the courts' practice of following the rulings
made by them in previous decisions involving similar fact situations. "Stare
decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right." 16 Knowing
15. Revolution and Counter Revolution, 7 ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 367-376 (1931).
16. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Burnet v. Colorado Oil and Gas Co., 286

U. S. 406 (1932).
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that the court will follow the rules established by its previously decided cases,
a decision furnishes a norm to guide our conduct. His second argument is that
court adjudications are used to define and determine the scope of various interests in property when the ownership rights have been divided. It is essential
that the grantor know the legal effect that will be,given to the phraseology used
in his conveyance; the purchaser will hesitate to buy or develop property which
may be burdened with an insecure title and with a risk of loss of his investment. Cardozo's third argument in support of stare decisis is as follows: If
a group of cases involve the same point of law, the parties expect the same
decision by the court. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on
opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was
defendant, I shall look for judgment in my favor today when I am plaintiff.
To decide differently would be an infringement of my rights.' 7 Adherence to
precedent must be the rule rather than the excption if litigants are to have
faith in the administration of justice in the courts.18
A well-justified criticism of the courts has been that jurists have in times
past allowed words to have finality per se, tending to identify the techniques
of law as ends rather than means, so that Justice Cardozo was prompted to
write: "A fruitful parent of injustice is the tyranny of concepts." "' Thurman
Arnold devoted two books to a clarification of our'confused thinking which
resulted from our devotion to words and symbols. 2 0 Georges Gurvitch noted
that the sociologists, too, were addicted to symbolism, and wrote that "the
doctrines of Sociological positivism, naturalism, behaviorism and formalism
have been destructive to the development of sociology, as well as the sociology
of law." 21
There is a widening gulf between traditional law and the reality of law;
this is a problem of our epoch. The jural formulas have proved themselves
incapable of capturing the flow of real life. There is a constant need for legal
innovation, but this step should not be taken without calling in the sociology
of law. Sociology is often absent from legal education and never occupies the
place to which it is entitled; and we find that the jurists have given birth
to sociological jurisprudence in this country.
I During the last century a high degree of specialization has developed within
the professions, particularly in the fields of education, medicine, and law.
Problems have arisen as a result of this specialization. As an example, medical
research has been, of necessity, confined largely to the laboratory and the
17. MILLER,

THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE

335 (1903).

18. CAR ozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 34 (1921).
19. CGMozo, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENcE 61 (1920); cJ. Hynes v. New York

Central Ry. Co., 231 N. Y. 229, 131 N. E. 898, 900 (1921).

20. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935); ARNOLD, FOLKLORE OF CArITALxsm (1937).
21. GuRvITcH, op.cit. supra note 3, at 14.

COMMENTS

117

practicing physician must rely on research centers for the development of
technical analysis and scientific advancement. Specialization has been less extensive, but nevertheless exists in the legal profession. A troublesome problem
resulting from specialization in the professions is the viscosity and paucity of
communication between practitioner and research center.
In the specialization of law, there appear to be three main categories: those
of the practitioner, the sociologist, and the philosopher. The practitioner of
jurisprudence is no less than a social engineer. He is in close contact with the
facts of life. He must constantly revise his ideas and remold his theories to
meet the fact situations to which they apply. To the practitioner are entrusted
the problems of application, and the use of techniques in fitting the principles
to concrete cases. It is the function of the legal philosopher to give to the
practitioner the criterion of jural values which aid in attaining concrete goals.
The sociologist of law contributes for the use of the jurists an objective description of the social reality of law, valid in a given milieu. The work of the
sociologist stops with the objective meanings, with the study of chances of
probability and chances of social behavior. The verification of the objectivity
of these meanings, it should be remembered, belongs to the philosopher of law.
Successful coordination of sociologists' and jurists' functions was illustrated
22
by Justice Gardozo in his lectures, The Nature of the Judicial Process. It
was in 1907 that the highest court of New York declared unconstitutional the
statute forbidding night work for women.23 Eight years later, with a fuller
knowledge based on investigations of social workers, the New York court
24
held a like statute to be reasonable and valid.
If judges have misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if the mores of an
earlier day are no longer those of today, those decisions ought not to tie the
hands of their successors. History and precedent is only one of the departments of knowledge available to the judges and lawyers for their information,
inspiration and decision. Justice Cardozo's view is that the "judicial process,"
in the main, reveals a conflict between two groups of interests: on the one
hand, the social interests in the uniformity, the security and the predictability
of the law; and on the other hand, the social interests in equity and fairness
of the immediate social interests presented by each controversy. How is the
judge to know when one interest outweighs the other? The answer is obtained
from knowledge, study, reflection and from experience on the bench; in brief,
from life itself.
GLYNN A. PUGH

22. William L. Storrs Lectur-e Series, 1921, before the Law School of Yale Univer(1921).
23. People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131, 81 N. E. 778 (1907).
24. People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395, 108 N. E. 643 (1915).
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